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Stuart Weiner and Julian Wright should be commended for the efforts
they have made to assemble comparative information about interchange
fees, no-surcharge rules, and related practices and regulatory issues from
various countries.
1 It is clear from their work that much remains hidden
from view about interchange fees and vertical restrictions in payments net-
works. They are, in fact, able to report on interchange fee trends in only a
relative handful of countries—and many of those have experienced active
regulatory or other legal investigations or interventions concerning inter-
change fees.
In addition to offering useful descriptive data and information about
interchange fees and related issues in various countries, Weiner and Wright
attempt a positive analysis of interchange fees; that is, they attempt to ana-
lyze possible reasons why interchange fees tend to be set at particular lev-
els. They concede their relative lack of success in this effort, concluding
only that “interchange fees will be determined by multiple factors.”
2 My
paper will focus on this interesting attempt to account for differences in
interchange fees in various countries.
I. WHAT DO INTERCHANGE FEES DO?
Explaining why interchange fees are likely to be set at particular levels
requires some hypothesis or competing hypotheses concerning the actual
effects of interchange fees and the competitive pressures, if any, that might
influence the level of the fees. Explanations for what interchange fees actu-
ally do in payments markets range from essentially semantic or legal argu-
ments to highly theoretical economic models, but they tend to fall into sev-
eral general categories, at least some of which might not be mutually exclu-
sive. I categorize these as pro-competitive or anticompetitive, depending
on whether the hypothesis involves achievement of efficiencies or simply
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 the extraction of profit through the exercise of market power, although nei-
ther the authors of the various articles on interchange fees nor Weiner and
Wright would necessarily agree with my characterization.
A. Pro-competitive  hypotheses
Three principal economic defenses have been offered in support of
claims that interchange fees have important pro-competitive or efficiency-
enhancing economic effects. These include claims that:
• Interchange fees balance a two-sided payments system market to 
correct an indirect “network externality” and solve a chicken-and-egg
entry barrier problem;
• Interchange fees solve a “usage externality” in which consumers 
otherwise would have little incentive to use cards, which are assumed
to impose lower costs on merchants; or
• Interchange fees are needed to reimburse card issuers for specif-
ic services they provide for the benefit of merchants and their banks
(for example, the interest-free grace period, the payment guarantee,
and processing).
The last of these explanations has received relatively little attention from or
support by economists but has been received more favorably by some 
regulators. This is perhaps due to its tractability and amenability to a 
regulatory solution, but the notion that Visa based its interchange fee on a meas-
ure of costs also was considered by the court to be an important factor in Visa’s
favor in the NaBanco interchange fee litigation of the early 1980s. A cost-based
reimbursement justification for interchange also has reportedly been advanced
by MasterCard in defense of its interchange fees.
3 MasterCard now discloses the
relative importance of the principal cost components it claims are the basis for
cross-border interchange fees in Europe.
4
There is a significant conceptual problem with the cost-based defense of
interchange fees. First, issuer costs are endogenous to the level of the fees.
In response to an increase in interchange fees, issuers will have an incentive
to spend more promoting their cards and enhancing their rebate programs.
As Weiner and Wright explain, “Even with a zero interchange fee, issuers
will cover their costs, in equilibrium, by charging cardholders more.”
5
In today’s electronic payment systems, it is possible for a card issuer to
assess competitively determined fees directly on customers whose transac-
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 tions caused the issuing bank to incur costs (or perhaps waive such fees as
part of a bundle of services, fees, and other banking arrangements). Issuing
banks, moreover, are in a far better position to control costs such as credit
and cardholder fraud losses, promotional costs, and the interest-free peri-
od, than are merchant acquirer banks or the merchants, which have no
control over issuer decisions to offer credit, authorize transactions based on
cardholder characteristics, or set the terms of card plans, including the
interest-free period. 
It might be possible to test whether the associations set interchange fees
to reimburse issuers for specific costs by analyzing whether interchange fee
movements are correlated with known changes in the claimed underlying
cost elements (for example, lower cost of funds, fraud rates, credit losses,
etc.). Even a finding of such a correlation, however, might merely establish
that interchange fees induce additional rent-seeking expenditures, liberal-
ized incentive plans, and reduced credit standards.
In contrast to the cost reimbursement explanation, the two types of
externality explanations have received a significant amount of economic
attention, ranging from vague assertions about the need for interchange
fees to balance the two sides of the payments market, to complex theoret-
ical modeling of this claimed balancing or of the usage externality (differ-
ences in costs imposed on merchants as a result of consumer payment
choices not accompanied by differences in retail prices).
Some of the efficiency claims concerning interchange fees are based on
an assumption that card-issuing banks have unilateral market power. They
are, therefore, related somewhat to what I term the anticompetitive expla-
nation. (If even individual issuers have significant market power in the
credit card market, then they obviously possess collective market power.)
In this pro-competitive scenario, however, the idea is that if individual
issuers have market power, they are likely to restrict output and set prices—
for example, transaction fees—too high. To the extent an interchange fee
acts like a subsidy to card issuing, it might be used to offset the effects of
issuer market power.
6
There are significant difficulties with the hypothesis that interchange fees
achieve efficiencies by subsidizing issuers with market power. For one thing,
the theory directly contradicts one of the card associations’ primary
antitrust defenses—their contention that competition among issuers is so
intense that it would be impossible for any network practice, including the
imposition of interchange fees, to harm the public. In this view, a fee set too
high simply would be rebated back to the public by card-issuing banks.
7
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power can be efficient is not unique to payments systems or two-sided
markets. Subsidizing monopolists, as a theoretical matter, might be alloca-
tively efficient, but there are significant wealth transfers and public policy
issues involved. One could perhaps argue that Microsoft, for example, has
market power and therefore does not sell enough copies of its Windows
operating system, resulting in too little use of computers. But Microsoft is
not permitted to impose a retail sales tax on other goods or services and use
the revenue to subsidize itself for each copy of Windows it sells. Yet, this is
what is happening with interchange fees. Issuing banks (with collective, if
not unilateral, market power) collectively control the card associations,
which set the interchange fees collected by those issuing banks. Merchants
pass the increased costs along to all customers regardless of payment
method used, so retail prices increase to all consumers. As discussed below,
moreover, there is no competitive mechanism to ensure an efficient out-
come in which the associations consider not only the welfare of card-issu-
ing banks, but also the welfare of consumers generally, including when
consumers use alternative payment methods such as cash, checks, and PIN
debit cards.
The usage externality refers to the fact that consumers choose the
method of payment. But although merchant costs vary with respect to
those consumer choices, consumers do not internalize those cost differ-
ences because, as just described, merchants set a single retail price irrespec-
tive of payment method. The hypothesis that interchange fees are correct-
ing a usage externality depends on an assumption that cards (absent inter-
change fees) significantly reduce merchant costs, and merchants would
want to subsidize card use. At least if the merchant acquiring market is
competitive, this hypothesis generates testable implications. Merchants, for
example, should collectively approve of interchange fees. A merchant
should have the ability to choose and disclose the level of interchange fee
that will apply to his or her transactions and have that amount rebated
directly as a credit to the cardholder. If interchange fees are solving usage
externalities, moreover, the cost (including interchange fees) to a merchant
of accepting various payment methods should be about the same.
B. Anticompetitive  hypothesis
Weiner and Wright describe how interchange fees might be used to shift
revenue to the side of the market with more voting power or market
power.
8 Because these effects are either unrelated to, or in addition to, any
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 claimed efficiencies, I label them here anticompetitive rather than pro-
competitive, but it should be clear that these are my distinctions, not those
expressed in Weiner and Wright’s paper.
To explain how anticompetitive effects can arise from interchange fees,
consider some of the possibilities described by Weiner and Wright—possibil-
ities that, I suggest, resemble what is actually happening in the marketplace:
• “[C]osts are fully passed through on the acquiring side” (or close to it),
so acquirers respond to an increase in interchange fees with nearly an
identical increase in merchant fees.
9
• Issuers respond to an increase in interchange fees with less than a per-
fect pass-through to cardholders. This will “increase issuers’ profits,”
“increase the overall level of fees,” and induce “more promotion of card
services by issuers.”
10
• “Merchants will accept cards, in part, to attract customers from other
merchants.”  They “will increase the amount they will be prepared to
pay . . . above that determined solely from any transactional benefits 
. . .” so that “the card association will want to set a higher interchange
fee.”
11 They explain, “Essentially, if merchants have little resistance to
paying merchant fees because of their need to do so to attract cus-
tomers, then card schemes will drive higher card volumes and profits
by setting relatively high interchange fees.”
12
• Competition between rival networks does not constrain interchange
fees to any claimed efficient level and does not prevent the exercise of
market power.
13 A network reducing interchange fees gets no addition-
al sales volume, because “merchants may continue to accept both
cards, given they expect consumers to hold only one type of card.”
14
Worse, “greater intersystem competition can cause card associations to
increase their interchange fees.”
15 In other words, to the extent compe-
tition occurs, it takes the form of associations—run collectively by
issuing banks?— competing for the loyalty of issuing banks by offer-
ing higher collectively set interchange fees paid by merchants. 
While other theoretical possibilities are discussed by Weiner and Wright,
if this set of possibilities resembles the actual situation, then banks have an
economic incentive to use interchange fees to collectively exercise market
power. I suggest that whatever optimal interchange fee might be implied
by the application of one or another theoretical model, the principal eco-
nomic force motivating interchange fees is the ability of card-issuing banks
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methods. This latter effect occurs because merchants generally do not dis-
criminate in price between card and non-card transactions. As a result, an
association reducing fees gets fewer sales, not more (because some of the
additional fee revenue is shared with cardholders who use that network).
Competition between the associations will not constrain interchange fees
to some claimed optimal level, and may, in fact, facilitate a move toward
the monopoly level of merchant fees.
How accurate are the assumptions underlying this anticompetitive sce-
nario? There is general agreement that the acquiring market in the United
States, at least to date, has been intensely competitive; Visa has acknowl-
edged that changes in interchange fees flow through to merchants in an
equal amount. (This may be untrue in countries that lack effective acquir-
er competition.) On the issuing side, however, pass-through is far from
perfect, even in the United States with its thousands of issuers, many of
which engage in intense nationwide marketing efforts. There are probably
a number of reasons for this. As a practical matter, it may be costly to enact
and inform consumers about reductions in prices or enhanced rebates
when those consumers are already receiving zero or negative effective
prices. In addition, cardholder switching costs may permit issuers to retain
profits from increased interchange fees on charges made by inframarginal
customers who do not switch to slightly enhanced card plans with each
new increase in interchange fees. 
Non-price competition is ubiquitous in the U.S. card industry. This is
seen not only in perks like the frequent flier miles and cash rebates offered
by some cards but also in the huge growth in solicitation efforts by card-
issuing banks. As Chart 1 shows, bank card issuers sent nearly 5.25 billion
direct mail solicitations to U.S. households in 2004. Most creditworthy
households already have a MasterCard or Visa card, however, and the aver-
age response rate to these solicitation offers has fallen to only 0.4 percent.
The billions of solicitations, meanwhile, were accompanied by only 2.7
million net additional cardholders—about one new customer for each
1,900 solicitations mailed, and similar to the growth of the overall U.S.
population. So it would seem hard to claim that interchange fees are 
necessary today to overcome a chicken-and-egg entry barrier problem. 
The pattern of solicitation and other costs incurred to enlist credit card
customers is consistent with the expectation by banks that they can expect
to earn a stream of profits from cardholders over an extended period of
time. Moreover, the high account acquisition costs consume some of the
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 interchange fee revenue, reducing the revenue available to pass through to
cardholders. The often-cited cash and especially in-kind rebates (for exam-
ple, frequent flier program credits) are obtained by only some cardholders,
and these rebates are likely worth substantially less on average than the
interchange fees paid to issuing banks.
Even in the anticompetitive scenario there are some economic constraints
on the level of interchange fees; they are simply insufficient to generate
competitive retail prices. The principal constraints are determined by the
willingness and credibility of threats by merchants to drop acceptance of
cards and the ability of merchants to steer customers to the merchants’ pre-
ferred payment methods. 
Although the card associations tout the additional sales obtained by a mer-
chant as a benefit provided by accepting their cards, aggregate retail sales in
the economy cannot be increased for all merchants in all years as a result of
the introduction of a particular card brand (beyond any actual efficiency sav-
ings generated by that payment method). Even if individual merchants each
accept a card brand, if they could act collectively, they might choose not to
accept the brand. The difference between the private benefit to a merchant
and the social value to all merchants of a merchant’s acceptance decision was
noted by Katz and corresponds to the strategic versus transactional motives
to accept credit cards discussed by Weiner and Wright.
16
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Chart 1: 






























0.0The anticompetitive explanation of interchange fees thus leads to some
predictions. If interchange fees are not achieving significant transactional
benefits for a merchant, but rather exploiting its unilateral inability to
profitably refuse a card brand, then this suggests that the networks will let
issuers, not merchants, determine the level of interchange fees. Issuer con-
centration will likely be irrelevant to the level of interchange fees because
the fees are set by the issuers acting collectively through their associations,
and the profit-maximizing interchange “tax” rate or rates will be driven by
the maximum amount merchants are willing to pay and the ability of the
associations to price-discriminate so as to capture as much of this value as
possible.
17 Merchants with reduced willingness to pay—such as those with
low profit margins; high customer access to other well-accepted, low-cost
forms of payment; and in which card penetration among competitors is
low—may be expected to pay lower interchange fees (if the association 
discriminates among merchant types). Merchants in highly concentrated 
merchant sectors, for which the social benefit may be closer to the private 
benefit of accepting the cards, also may pay less. Large merchants may pay
less also because they represent a greater threat to the associations’ 
interchange fee structures. The defection by a handful of large retailers
from a single branded network may induce a significant number of issuers
and cardholders to switch to an alternative brand and could induce 
consumers to become more accustomed to relying on multiple card 
choices, lessening the intensity of their preference to use a particular card. 
Interchange fees also will be constrained somewhat by the ability of 
merchants to surcharge card transactions. As interchange fees and merchant
fees increase, it becomes increasingly attractive for merchants to discriminate
in pricing between expensive credit card payments and less costly payment
methods (for example, cash, check, and—so far—PIN debit transactions).
Merchant retail pricing freedom can therefore act as a deterrent to further
interchange fee increases, particularly if fees are already relatively high.
Finally, it should be noted that maximizing profits from interchange fees
is likely to be a dynamic process, introducing timing complications to any
analysis of fee trends. An association might seek to penetrate a merchant
sector using low interchange fees, for example, then—once most or all
major competitors in that sector accept the cards—begin increasing the
fees to those merchants.
II. INTERPRETING THE EVIDENCE
The extent to which collectively set interchange fees can be used by card
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 issuers as an anticompetitive exercise of market power to collect tax revenue
from merchants (and their customers) would appear to be limited important-
ly by characteristics of merchants, at least in addition to, and perhaps instead
of, the characteristics of issuers, acquirers, and the relative market shares of the
associations.
18 Weiner and Wright, however, focus their empirical analysis on
the latter, for which they are able to assemble some data.
“The lack of any systematic data on interchange fees limits a serious
empirical analysis of these issues,” so Weiner and Wright attempt only a
simple correlation analysis.
19 The authors first test whether there is any 
correlation between the level of interchange fees and the level of issuer con-
centration in a country, reasoning that a “positive relationship between
interchange fees and issuer market concentration is predicted by balancing
considerations . . . and also, so as to shift revenues to issuers . . . assuming
higher issuer concentration corresponds to higher market power.”
20 They
also test for any correlation between the level of fees and the difference
between issuing and acquiring concentration, and between the level of fees
and system-level concentration. None of these correlations is significant.
Weiner and Wright do identify upward trends over time in the United
States in both the five-firm (issuing) concentration ratio and interchange
fees but find “only a weak (at best) positive relationship between issuer
concentration and interchange fees” when concentration is measured using
the HHI.
21 Although Weiner and Wright cannot rule out that any time
series correlation is spurious, they suggest that “the increasing ability of
large issuers to play one network off against another to raise interchange
fees may provide a more fruitful avenue for explaining the finding.”
22 To
the extent there is an association between issuer concentration and inter-
change fees, this finding is consistent both with the balancing and the 
revenue shifting hypotheses described by Weiner and Wright, but there
probably will be no disagreement from merchants in the United States that
competition has been serving the interest of large issuers, not merchants.
None of the measures analyzed statistically by Weiner and Wright direct-
ly reflects the ability of merchants to resist paying the fees, which in turn
is governed by their unilateral economic incentives to refuse to accept a
card brand, their ability to surcharge costly cards (and the effectiveness of
other steering efforts), and the potential consequences to the associations
and the fee revenue earned by their issuing members if the merchant
should refuse their cards.
Empirical data with which to perform a more complete statistical analy-
sis of interchange fees may be scarce. As Lloyd Constantine correctly notes,
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change fees.
23 In particular, the hypothesis that the associations are setting
their interchange fees like a monopoly, at the maximum amount 
merchants will bear, is consistent with the following marketplace facts:
• Weiner and Wright provide a list of credit card interchange fee trends
in 10 countries (or EU cross-border). In eight of these, interchange fees
are declining or stable. In five of the eight, merchants have been or are
permitted to surcharge card use, or surcharges are being debated. In
each of the other three stable or declining fee locations, regulators have
intervened or are investigating interchange fees and/or surcharges. Fees
are increasing only in the United States and Canada, where surcharg-
ing is not permitted and there is no active regulatory intervention.
• In Australia, where at least some segments of the merchant sector are
relatively more concentrated than in the United States, credit card
interchange fees were relatively low even before the Reserve Bank of
Australia intervened (and debit card interchange fees flow toward the
merchant side of the market). This is consistent with the social bene-
fit of merchant acceptance being closer to merchants’ private benefit of
acceptance in Australia than in other regions.
• The defection of very large merchants (to, for example, a subset of
branded cards, private-label cards, or perhaps a new general-purpose
card system) poses a greater threat to the interchange fee system and to
association market share than the loss of smaller merchants. In the
United States, large merchants have received lower interchange fees
than small merchants.
• Merchants with low profit margins and with customers accustomed to
using other payment methods have a smaller private benefit from
accepting cards. Supermarkets correspondingly have received a lower
interchange fee from the associations.
Although Weiner and Wright focus on what might cause interchange fees
to vary across countries and over time, the average level of interchange fees—
which amount to a private sales tax on nearly the entire retail economy—is
also of concern. Despite some examples of merchants receiving reduced
interchange fees, the competitive position of merchants is generally quite
weak relative to banks that can act as industry-spanning cartels. Moreover,
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 once merchants throughout a retail category, such as supermarkets, begin to
accept credit cards, it is much more difficult for any one merchant to drop
cards if interchange fees begin to rise. 
III. CONCLUSION
The focus of my paper has been the part of the Weiner and Wright analy-
sis to which the authors have given the least emphasis, particularly at the
conference where this paper was presented. By my focus, I do not intend
to detract from their efforts to obtain and summarize interchange fee and
related data and trends from various countries. Indeed, their difficulties in
obtaining data suggest a possible role for public authorities in facilitating
the release of such information. Yet, the lack of comprehensive data con-
cerning these issues in all regions does not preclude a comprehensive and
critical economic analysis of a practice that amounts to collective price fix-
ing by members of an industry. I suggest that the facts are consistent with
the hypothesis that interchange fees are being used as an anticompetitive
exercise of collective market power, constrained only by relatively weak
merchant ability to resist acceptance of the cards.
Author’s note: The author would like to thank Allan Shampine, Stuart Weiner, Julian
Wright, and participants at the Santa Fe conference for helpful comments.
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1Weiner and Wright (2005).
2Weiner and Wright (2005, p. 38).
3Cruickshank (2000, p. 262).
4MasterCard states, “The three main cost categories proportions, as measured in
MasterCard’s most recent MasterCard Consumer cards cost study and rounded to
the nearest percent, are . . . payment guarantee costs, 50 percent; free funding costs,
25 percent; [and] processing costs, 25 percent.” MasterCard Intra-European Fall-
back POS Interchange Fees & Cost Components, 
http://www.mastercardinternational.com/corporate/mif_information.html, visited
June 5, 2005. 
5Weiner and Wright (2005, p. 42). By charging more, presumably, Weiner and
Wright mean to encompass reduced rebates offered on some card plans, annual fees,
and perhaps transaction fees.
6Weiner and Wright (2005, p. 29) write “higher issuer margins . . . requires
higher interchange fees to optimally balance the two sides of the market…”
7Of course, even if all supracompetitive fee revenues were rebated to cardholders,
there would be a net transfer from non-card customers to card customers and a
distortion of payment choices as some consumers are inefficiently steered toward
card usage.
8Weiner and Wright (2005, p. 30).
9Weiner and Wright (2005, p. 30).
10Weiner and Wright (2005, p. 30). Weiner and Wright explain, “If issuers get to
retain some of the . . . increase in interchange fees, the card association may then
end up setting interchange fees higher than is optimal . . . .” Even with perfect pass-
through, however, they will have an incentive to set interchange fees at a high level.
In such an (unlikely) scenario, however, it will simply be card users who obtain all
of the benefits paid for by those same cardholders and all other consumers. 
11Weiner and Wright (2005, pp. 30-31).
12Weiner and Wright (2005, p. 31). Differentiation among individual issuers’
card programs, spurred by interchange fees, leads to a situation in which a merchant
refusing one network will likely lose a significant amount of sales to another
merchant even if the customers have the ability to use other cards.
13Weiner and Wright (2005, p. 31) cite Guthrie and Wright (2003) in describing
how a “competitive bottleneck” might exist.
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 14Weiner and Wright (2005, p. 31). “More generally, a similar result may arise if
cardholders rather than merchants ultimately determine which card will be used.”
Cardholders may develop stronger preferences to use particular cards as a result of
the interchange fee system, which has encouraged the creation and enhancement of
cards with loyalty benefit features such as rebates that escalate in value as cumula-
tive spending during a year increases.
15Weiner and Wright (2005, p. 31-32).
16Katz (2001, p. 19).
17Jean-Charles Rochet notes the possibility that the “privately optimal” inter-
change fee—the profit-maximizing fee from the association’s perspective—is given
by “maximum value of the interchange fee . . . that is compatible with sellers’
acceptance” (in other words, the monopoly fee). In Rochet (2003, p. 104)
18A complication arises if acquirers have market power, insofar as both acquirers
and issuers (through the interchange fee) would want to tax the same retail sales. To
the extent that acquirer markups make it more difficult for issuers to tax retail sales,
interchange fees might be lower in regions with acquirer monopolies, all else equal.
In such regions, the resulting merchant fee might be similar to or perhaps higher
than the merchant fees in competitive acquiring regions.
19Weiner and Wright (2005, p. 32).
20Weiner and Wright (2005, p. 32).
21Weiner and Wright (2005, p. 37).
22Weiner and Wright (2005, p. 38).
23Constantine (2005).
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